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Abstract
Although the notion of superdeterminism can, in principle, account for the violation of
the Bell inequalities, this potential explanation has been roundly rejected by the quantum
foundations community. The arguments for rejection, one of the most substantive coming from
Bell himself, are critically reviewed. In particular, analysis of Bell’s argument reveals an implicit
unwarranted assumption: that the Euclidean metric is the appropriate yardstick for measuring
distances in state space. Bell’s argument is largely negated if this yardstick is instead based on
the alternative p-adic metric. Such a metric, common in number theory, arises naturally when
describing chaotic systems which evolve precisely on self-similar invariant sets in their state
space. A locally-causal realistic model of quantum entanglement is developed, based on the
premise that the laws of physics ultimately derive from an invariant-set geometry in the state
space of a deterministic quasi-cyclic mono-universe. This dynamically invariant self-similar
subset is locally homeomorphic to Z2 × R where Z2 denotes the set of 2-adic integers and R
denotes a state-space trajectory, or history. Based on this, the notion of a complex Hilbert
vector is reinterpreted in terms of an uncertain selection from a finite sample space of states,
leading to a novel form of ‘consistent histories’ based on number-theoretic properties of the
transcendental cosine function. For example, for a Mach-Zehnder experiment with phase angle
φ, histories where cosφ and φ/pi are describable by a finite number of bits are, by number
theory, almost always mutually incompatible, all supplementary variables being equal. This
leads to novel realistic interpretations of position/momentum non-commutativity, EPR, the Bell
Theorem and the Tsirelson bound. In this inherently holistic theory - neither conspiratorial,
retrocausal, fine tuned nor nonlocal - superdeterminism is not invoked by fiat but is emergent
from these ‘consistent histories’ number-theoretic constraints. Because of finite experimental
precision, experimenters have no direct control on whether cosφ is finitely describable or not.
Hence, Bell inequalities are violated without constraining experimenter free will. Quantum
decoherence is described by chaotic riddled-basin dynamics, leading to a natural clustering of
trajectories (’measurement eigenstates’) on the invariant set. The algebraically closed complex
Hilbert Space and associated Schro¨dinger/Dirac equation arise in the singular limit when a
fractal parameter N goes to infinity. Invariant set theory provides new perspectives on many
of the contemporary problems at the interface of quantum and gravitational physics, and, if
correct, may signal the end of particle physics beyond the Standard Model.
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1 Introduction
The recent experiments by Shalm et al [40] on entangled photon pairs appear to have nailed the
coffin on local realism, i.e. have comprehensively ruled out putative theories of quantum physics
which are both locally causal and deterministic. However, this conclusion is predicated on an
assumption which is impossible to test with this type of experiment: that the experimental mea-
surement settings are physically independent of any of the properties of the entangled particles.
This is variously referred to as the ‘Free Choice’ or ‘Free Will’ assumption, the ‘No Conspiracy’
assumption, or, more neutrally, the ‘Measurement Independence’ assumption. A theory in which
this assumption is violated is referred to as ‘superdeterministic’. Most physicists who work in the
field of either quantum foundations or quantum information theory feel that this assumption is self
evident and are consequently almost unanimous in rejecting superdeterministic approaches to fun-
damental physics. Reasons for rejection include implausible conspiracies, an inability to do science,
violation of experimenter free will, or unacceptable fine tuning. In this paper I will explain why I
believe the arguments against superdeterminism are unconvincing, and will propose a new theory
of quantum physics - invariant set theory - which is not superdeterministic by fiat, but from which
plausible superdeterminism is emergent. Although locally causal and realistic, the model violates
the Bell inequalities as does quantum theory. It has none of the objectionable properties typically
associated with a superdeterministic theory.
To make such a claim I need some ‘new meat’:
• Firstly and most importantly, the developments in this paper are based around the use of
the p-adic metric. Number theory provides us with precisely two norm-based metrics: the
Euclidean and the p-adic [15]. It is proposed that both play central but distinct roles in
physics: the former in space-time, the latter in state space. Use of the p-adic metric in state
space is consistent with a physical theory where states evolve precisely on certain self-similar
dynamically invariant geometries in state space. This can arise if the corresponding laws of
physics are ultimately derived from such state-space geometries.
• Secondly, a representation of the multiplicative group of 2N th roots of unity is described
in terms of cyclic permutations of 2N -element bit strings. Based on this, complex Hilbert
vectors (and tensor products) are interpreted in terms of uncertain selections of bits from sets
of 2N -element sample spaces.
• Thirdly, the notion of finite experimental precision is exploited. This, together with the items
above, ensures that invariant set theory is consistent with experimenter free will. An interplay
between the Euclidean metric in space-time and the p-adic metric in state space will be used
to demonstrate why the violation of the Bell inequalities is robust and requires no special
precision on the part of the experimenter, in setting experimental parameters. The notion of
finite precision is actually not so new; it has already been shown to be capable of nullifying
the Kochen-Specker theorem [20].
My primary motivation for this work was less about resolving the Bell Theorem, and more
about exploring novel possibilities for synthesising quantum and gravitational physics - ones that
contrast with conventional approaches based on quantum field theory - which might help resolve
contemporary problems at the interface of quantum and gravitational physics: the dark universe,
black hole information loss, the 2nd law of thermodynamics, space-time singularities and so on.
Some speculative remarks on these issues are addressed towards the end of the paper.
3
The structure of this paper is provided in the contents listing above. Most of the technical
discussion is relegated to Appendices. No prior knowledge about the p-adic metric is assumed.
2 Why is Superdeterminism so Disliked?
In this Section I review the reasons why superdeterminism has been largely rejected by the quantum
foundations community and argue why I find these reasons unconvincing. In laying out these
arguments, my purpose is not to change sceptical minds, but rather to try to persuade readers that
might otherwise be completely dismissive about the concept of superdeterminism, to read on.
Following the CHSH version of the Bell Theorem, Alice and Bob make measurements on some
entangled physical system. The measurement apparatus available to each experimenter has two
possible settings, referred to as 0 and 1. For each setting, the measurement has two possible
outcomes, also 0 and 1. If x and y refer to the settings, and a and b to the outcomes, then an
experiment over multiple measurements determines conditional frequencies of occurrence p(a, b|x, y).
A realistic theory attempts to explain these frequencies by assuming that a and b are determined
both by x and y and some supplementary information, represented by the generic variable λ, over
which the experimenters do not have control. In this way we can write
p(a, b|x, y) =
∑
λ
p(a, b|x, y, λ)p(λ|x, y) (1)
This equation has been written in a general probabilistic form, commonplace in modern accounts
of the Bell Theorem (e.g. [7]). This allows for probabilistic as well as deterministic models. In the
discussions below, I will be discussing a strictly deterministic model, so that either p(a, b|x, y, λ) = 1
or p(a, b|x, y, λ) = 0. Indeed, as discussed in Section 10, determinism is critically important in this
model, unlike in more conventional hidden-variable models. By contrast, p(λ|x, y) denotes some
non-trivial probability distribution, defined by frequentism on finite sample spaces Λxy.
The Measurement Independence assumption states that λ is not correlated with x and y, so
that
p(λ|x, y) = p(λ) (2)
or equivalently that Λxy = Λ, independent of x and y. As first recognised by Bell himself, if (2) is
violated in some putative hidden-variable theory, then this theory will not necessarily violate the
Bell inequality, even if the theory is locally causal and deterministic. A theory in which (2) does
not hold is said to be superdeterministic.
However, with one notable exception [43, 44] discussed in Section 9, contemporary researchers
are largely unequivocal about the correctness of (2). Wiseman and Cavalcanti [48] summarise the
prevailing view:
This temptation [to reject (2)] should vanish if the reader thinks through what it would
actually mean to explain away Bell correlations through the real (not just in-principle)
failure of free choice. There is no general theory that does this. If such a theory did
exist, it would require a grand conspiracy of causal relationships leading to results in
precise agreement with quantum mechanics, even though the theory itself would bear
no resemblance to quantum mechanics. Moreover, it is hard to imagine why it should
only be in Bell experiments that free choices would be significantly influenced by causes
relevant also to the observed outcomes. [R]ather, every conclusion based upon observed
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correlations, scientific or casual, would be meaningless because the observers’s method
would always be suspect. It seems to us that any such theory would be about as
plausible, and appealing, as, belief in ubiquitous alien mind-control.
This latter point is also emphasised by Arau´jo [2] who refers to (2) as the ‘no-conspiracy’ condition:
I think [(2)] is necessary to even do science, because if it were not possible to probe a
physical system independently of its state, we couldn’t hope to be able to learn what
its actual state is. It would be like trying to find a correlation between smoking and
cancer when your sample of patients is chosen by a tobacco company.
Shalm et al [40] also highlight the supposedly convoluted nature of physical reality if (2) is violated:
If [(2)] is not true, then a hidden variable could predict the chosen settings in advance and
use that information to produce measurement outcomes that violate a Bell inequality
Bell [3], in trying to get to the heart of the issue, advanced what I consider to be the most
important argument against superdeterminism. As part of this, Bell shows that experimenter free
will is not itself the fundamental issue - though I will discuss human free will in Section 7. In
particular, Bell replaces Alice and Bob with mechanical pseudo-random number generators. For
these machines, the output is extraordinarily sensitive to minute variations of the initial conditions.
In particular, Bell imagines that x and y are set equal to 0 if the millionth bit of some input variable
is a 0 and set equal to 1 if the millionth bit of the same input variable is a 1. That is to say, fixing
x fixes something about this input variable. Bell then writes [3]:
But this peculiar piece of information is unlikely to be the vital piece for any distinctively
different purpose, i.e. it is otherwise rather useless. With a physical shuffling machine,
we are unable to perform the analysis to the point of saying just what peculiar feature
of the input is remembered by the output. But we can quite reasonably assume that it
is not relevant for other purposes. In this sense the output of such a device is indeed a
sufficiently free variable for the purpose at hand. For this purpose the assumption [(2)]
is then true enough, and the [Bell] theorem follows.
These arguments may seem compelling. However, below I attempt to provide critiques of all of
them, leaving Bell’s argument for last.
In my view, it seems illogical to say that if a superdeterministic theory did exist, it would require
a grand conspiracy of causal relationships. The word ‘conspiracy’ implies something secret or covert.
If a plausible superdeterministic theory of quantum physics were somehow to be formulated, then
by definition the causal structure of the universe would be laid open for all to see and understand.
There would be no conspiracies by definition. Referring to (2) as a ‘no-conspiracy’ condition is
therefore prejudicial.
Moreover, if a plausible superdeterministic theory were able to be formulated, then it also seems
to me unlikely that it is only in Bell experiments that ‘free choices would be influenced by causes
relevant also to the observed outcomes’. Rather, this situation would become the norm where all
non-classical measurements are made, i.e. where the quantum mechanical observables are non-
commutative. Far from being special, this situation may be completely ubiquitous in quantum
physics. Does that make the problem worse? Far from it, as I attempt to show below.
The notion that if a superdeterministic theory did exist, its results would have to be ‘in agree-
ment with quantum mechanics even though the theory would bear no resemblance to quantum
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mechanics’, could be a merit rather than a drawback. Results from General Relativity agree well
with Newtonian Gravity in the appropriate limit, even though General Relativity bears no resem-
blance to Newtonian theory. Given the ongoing problems synthesising quantum and gravitational
physics, some might view the formulation of a deterministic locally causal (a fortiori geometric)
theory, whose results agree with quantum theory but which bears no resemblance to quantum
theory, to be something that is sorely needed! This is my view, at least.
And before worrying about ‘alien mind control’ I argue in Section 8 that by rejecting superde-
terminism a priori, we may, ironically, have been subverted in our thinking about the Bell Theorem
by something just as insidious but rather closer to home - gene control!
Shalm et al’s notion that a hidden variable could somehow predict the chosen settings in advance
and use that information to ensure measurement statistics are quantum theoretic, is rather anthro-
pomorphic. It conjures up a picture of a Laplacian demon, furiously computing the future before
it happens, and then rearranging things to ensure the quantum theoretic result always obtains. If
this is how the world works, it would indeed be bizarre. However, if the demon could predict the
chosen settings in advance, then ordinary determinism (never mind superdeterminism) would be in
deep trouble. Suppose λ is a set of Cauchy data on a spacelike hypersurface in the past of the event
where Alice chooses x. If the demon could use λ to predict Alice’s choice, and somehow chalk it up
for her to see, then Alice would merely have to choose differently to the predicted choice to create a
logical paradox. There is no paradox because, even if the laws of physics are deterministic, they are
not predictably so. From a practical perspective one could put it like this: if the laws of physics are
sufficiently chaotic, any reliable prediction would require a computational capability exceeding that
of the whole universe. Since our putative demon would necessarily be a subset of the universe, his
limited computational capability prevents such reliable prediction. These ideas can be expressed
more formally in terms of the Go¨del-Turing theorem: there are deterministic systems whose proper-
ties are generically not algorithmic at all. Fractals, the limiting states at t =∞ arising from certain
chaotic systems and to which we return below, provide a beautiful geometric manifestation of the
Go¨del-Turing theorem [6] [9]. (For this reason, there is actually no need to keep the supplementary
variables λ ‘hidden’ in a model which encodes the unpredictability of the real world.) In summary,
Shalm et al’s argument against superdeterminism assumes properties which such a theory need not
have.
The argument that we can’t do science when the system being measured is not fully independent
of the system that performs the measurement is reminiscent of the argument that it is not possible
to do objective science on the topic of consciousness, since we, the investigators, are conscious beings
and therefore not fully independent of the topic we investigate. However, given the extraordinary
advances in the science of consciousness in the last decade or so (e.g. using Functional MRI), this
argument does not appear to be sound. In the case of consciousness, it merely indicates that we
have to be careful when designing and analysing experiments which probe our and other animals’
consciousness, and I would say the same about analysis of experiments which probe quantum
physics. Fortunately, there is a way to analyse data without potential self-referential limitations.
That is to say, nature has given us the capability to study causal relationships where the system
and the measuring apparatus have become decoupled. It is the classical limit. Hence, if we want
to do science where we are sure that classical notions of measurement independence hold, then we
must do it in the classical limit (where observables commute). In any case, to say that we can’t do
science when not in the classical limit is countered explicitly by the theory discussed below, which
are being based on (what I think are) sound scientific principles.
In my view, the most important argument against superdeterminism was provided by Bell and
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this needs more extensive analysis. In Bell’s example, the number ‘one million’ is there to emphasise
that the output of the pseudo-random number machine depends on something arbitrarily small
(the logic works a fortiori if we replace ‘one million’ by ‘one trillion’). Since the supplementary
variables λ in principle describe all that is going on in the universe other than these bits - the moons
of Jupiter for example1 - then Bell is drawing attention to our intuition that surely the moons of
Jupiter couldn’t care less whether that millionth bit here on Earth was a 0 or a 1. Implicit in
Bell’s argument is that if for some strange reason you think that they do care about the millionth
digit, then surely they won’t care about the trillionth digit (and son on)! Hence, if we posit some
superdeterministic theory of quantum physics, then we need some argument to explain why the
moons do ‘care’, no matter how small the effect that sets x and y. Maybe we could suppose that,
for some theoretical reason, parts of the state space of the universe contains gaps or lacunae: regions
where, for some theoretical reason, no space-time trajectories, or ‘histories’, can exist. Maybe by
flipping the value of the millionth digit, but keeping fixed the supplementary variables (including
the moons of Jupiter), the state of the universe somehow falls into one of these lacunae. However,
be this as it may, this doesn’t address Bell’s concern that in such a theory, the condition of being
in a lacuna or otherwise would be sensitive to arbitrarily small perturbations (i.e. to the value of
the millionth digit of the random number generator input). Any theory describing this state of
affairs would be implausibly fine tuned. We require theories of physics to be structurally stable,
with gross properties which are not sensitive to arbitrarily small perturbations. After all, as Bell
pointed out, the experimenter’s hands tremble when she set the dials on her instruments. A that
requires the hands to be completely steady and the values of experimental parameters precise is
simply inconsistent with observation. Finely-tuned models, which appear to be implicit in all causal
description of the Bell inequalities [49], are not acceptable. Game, set and match to Bell? No!
3 Rethinking the Notion of State-Space Distance
There is a subtle but important issue in Bell’s argument above: perhaps the single most important
single issue in this paper. When we describe some perturbation as ‘small’ what do we mean?
Suppose, in a particular run of Bell’s pseudo-random number generator, the millionth digit was a
0 (and hence, in the consequent experiment, x = 0). Label the real world in which these events
transpire by U , and imagine a counterfactual world U ′, identical to U in all respects (including
the position of the moons of Jupiter) except that the millionth digit was a 1 rather than a 0. Is
the distance between U and U ′ small (say at the time the input variable was being inputted to
the pseudo-random number generator)? Certainly in terms of the familiar Euclidean metric, the
distance between U and U ′ can indeed be considered small (and can be made smaller still by making
the output of the machine sensitive to the trillionth rather than millionth input bit).
In assessing the distance between U and U ′, we are considering distances in state space (recall
Footnote 1 above). In physics, we typically use the Euclidean metric to define distances not only in
space-time but also in state space. Hence, when the philosopher David Lewis made the following
superficially incontrovertible statement in his seminal paper on causation [17]:
We may say that one world is closer to actuality than another if the first resembles the
1In [3] Bell notes: ‘In this matter of causality, it is a great inconvenience that the real world is given to us only
once. We cannot know what would have happened had something been different. We cannot repeat an experiment
changing just one variable; the hands of the clock will have moved and the moons of Jupiter.’ A perturbation which
changes just one variable is therefore a perturbation in state space, not in space-time.
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actual world more than the second does.
Lewis is implicitly assuming closeness is synonymous with smallness of the Euclidean metric. Math-
ematically, the Euclidean metric is ultimately a number-theoretic concept: given numbers x and
y, the Euclidean distance between them is |x − y| where | . . . | represents the absolute value (or
Euclidean norm). However, in number theory, there does exist another norm-induced metric, called
the p-adic metric (e.g. [15]), where p is typically a prime number. Moreover, by Ostrowski’s theo-
rem [15], the p-adic metric is the only norm-induced alternative to the Euclidean metric. As will
be discussed below (see also Fig 1), Lewis’ intuition is false if the notion of closeness is defined
p-adically.
Before outlining why, it is worth briefly discussing an analogy which illustrates the importance
of using the correct metric. At first sight, Penrose’s impossible triangle (Fig 4-7 of [32]) might
suggest something incomprehensible about physical space. However, this conclusion is only reached
because we visualise the triangle in 2-dimensional Euclidean space and therefore imagine that parts
of the triangle that are close in the Euclidean 2D metric, are physically close. However, this is not
so. As is well known, the object is constructible in 3-dimensional Euclidean space, whence one pair
of sides that appear to meet at a vertex, do not. The ends of these sides are far apart in the more
physically relevant Euclidean 3D metric. In the case of the impossible triangle, use of the wrong
metric could perhaps lead us into thinking that space is weirder than it really is.
The p-adic metric is very commonly used in number theory:
‘We [number theorists] tend to work as much p-adically as with the reals and com-
plexes nowadays, and in fact it it best to consider all at once.’ (Andew Wiles, personal
communication 2015.)
Physicists use real and complex numbers in equal measure, but, so far, not the p-adics2. However, if
there exist two and only two fundamentally inequivalent metrics in mathematics, why would physics
only make use of one of them and completely shun the other? Is there any overriding reason to use
the Euclidean metric in state space? I am not aware of one. Are there good physical reasons for
using the Euclidean metric in space-time and the p-adic metric in state space? I believe there are.
A brief review of p-adic numbers is given in Appendix A. An even briefer introduction is given
here. Given a distance function on the rationals Q, we can complete Q based on equivalence classes
of Cauchy sequences of rationals. Completion with respect to the Euclidean metric produces the
familiar real numbers R, whilst completion with respect to the p-adic metric produces a number
system, the field of p-adic numbers Qp, which is quite different to R. In my view, the most physical
way to understand the differences between these number systems is through their links to geometry.
R provides the basic building block to analyse Euclidean geometries. By contrast, a subset Zp of
Qp, known as the set of p-adic integers, is homeomorphic to self-similar Cantor sets C(p) with
p iterated pieces, i.e. to fractal geometries (see Fig 1a with p = 2, the value for p used in this
paper). We close the circle with physics by noting that fractals play a central role in describing
the asymptotic structure of certain deterministic chaotic dynamical systems [41], one of the most
famous examples being the Lorenz attractor [18]. Locally, these fractals describe a Cantor set’s
worth of trajectories, or histories as they are commonly described in quantum theory (I use both
words below). A schematic illustration of part of C(2)× R is given in Fig 1b.
2There have been attempts to use p-adics in physics, see. e.g. [46, 16]. However, in these approaches, the
p-adic metric was used to describe Plankian scales in space-time, and not as a fundamental yardstick in state
space. Moreover, so-called p-adic integers were not singled out as having special ontological status (see below). The
particular use of p-adic numbers in this paper is, I believe, new
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Figure 1: a) Some iterates of the Cantor Ternary Set C(2), itself equal to the intersection of all such
iterates and homeomorphic to the set of 2-adic integers Z2 ⊂ Q2. The points a and b both belong
to C(2) but the point c does not. Both the Euclidean and the 2-adic distance between a and b is
small. However, even though the Euclidean distance between a and c is smaller than between a and
b, the 2-adic distance between a and c is not smaller than between a and b. Hence b is 2-adically
closer to a than is c. b) Two trajectories or histories of the ith iterate Ci(2) × R of C(2) × R.
Zooming into one trajectory reveals two trajectories of Ci+1(2)× R and zooming into one of these
reveals two trajectories of Ci+2(2)× R, and so on.
To understand the key property of the p-adic metric needed to counter Bell’s argument against
superdeterminism, consider two points a and b which both lie on C(p). Then the p-adic distance
between a and b can be made as small as one likes by bringing a and b sufficiently close together.
(This is related to the fact that a and b can both be represented by elements of Zp.) However,
consider a third point c which does not lie on C(p), but, let’s say, in one of the lacunae between
pieces of C(p). Then the p-adic distance between a and c, or between b and c, cannot be made
smaller than p, no matter how small the Euclidean distance is between a and c or between b and c
3 Hence, distance measured using the p-adic metric provides a direct and natural way to determine
the ontology of putative states of a deterministic system which makes an ontological distinction
between those states lying on some fractal invariant subset of state space, and those not lying on
this invariant set. The theory that is developed below is predicated on the notion that whilst the
Euclidean metric is the metric of choice in space time, the 2-adic metric is the metric of choice in
state space.
What has this got to do with the Bell argument against superdeterminism? Let us suppose
that the universe U at any particular time can be considered the state of a deterministic dynamical
3There is a subtlety here. There are many real numbers which have no correspondence in Qp and hence whose p-
adic distance to the invariant set is undefined (but hence not small). However, Qp can be extended to an algebraically
complete field Cp, isomorphic to the field C of complex numbers [37]. This suggests that one should start with a state
space which is inherently complex, such as that in twistor theory [27], and then consider an embedded dynamically
invariant subset with a topological structure associated with the corresponding ring of integers of C2 which is 2-
adically distant from the rest of state space.
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system evolving precisely on a fractal invariant set IU [22], locally of the form C(2)× R in cosmo-
logical state space4 [23]. There are a number of cosmological implications for such a supposition,
discussed in Section 11. Such a model of the universe, although deterministic, is not classical. The
states of classical dynamical systems, being based on differential or difference equations of motion,
evolve from arbitrary states in state space, and therefore do not generically lie precisely on their
asymptotic invariant-set attractors except in the (classically unattainable) limit t = ∞. As men-
tioned above, from a p-adic perspective, the difference between not lying on IU and lying on IU
is never small, even for arbitrarily large t (and even if the difference appears very small from a
Euclidean perspective). That is to say, from a p-adic perspective, lying on IU precisely at t = ∞
is a singular limit [5]. The question posed at the beginning of this section can be posed as follows:
does the counterfactual world U ′ where the millionth input bit has been flipped, lie on IU or not?
If it does not, it cannot be considered close to U , whether it is the millionth or the trillionth digit
that has been flipped. At this stage in the paper we do not have enough information to say whether
U ′ lies on IU or not. We need to make contact with quantum physics, and complex Hilbert vectors
in particular.
Before concluding this Section, it can be noted that many of the methods of analysis (algebra,
calculus, Fourier transforms, and Lie group theory - the bread and butter of theoretical physics)
can be applied to the set of p-adic numbers [37]. In essence, p-adic numbers are to fractal geometry
as real numbers are to Euclidean geometry.
4 Number-Theoretic Consistent Histories and EPR
In this Section, a novel realistic ‘consistent-histories’ interpretation of complex Hilbert vectors
is developed. Consider a standard Mach-Zehnder interferometric experiment. Let x = 0 if the
experimenter chooses to perform a momentum measurement (see Fig 2a) and x = 1 if she chooses
to perform a position measurement (see Fig 2b). According to quantum theory, the input state
vector |a〉 is transformed by the non-commuting unitary operators
U =
(
1 1
1 −1
)
; V =
(
1 0
0 eiφ
)
When x = 0, the transformation is given by
|a〉 UV U7→ cos φ
2
|a〉+ sin φ
2
|a〉 (3)
and the probability of detection by the two detectors, is equal to cos2 φ/2 and sin2 φ/2 respectively.
When x = 1, the transformation is given by
|a〉 V U7→ 1√
2
(|a〉+ eiφ|a〉) (4)
and the probability of detection by either of the detectors, and hence the frequency of detection
by either detector, is equal to 1/2. The experimenter is of course free to set φ and choose between
x = 0 and x = 1 as she likes. However, necessarily φ can only be set to finite precision - the
4In Appendix E we show that the trajectories, or histories, are in fact discretised in the time direction. Hence,
strictly, we should write C(p)× Q rather than C(2)× R.
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Figure 2: a) A momentum experiment. b) A position experiment (obtained by removing the second
half-silvered mirror) in the single photon Mach-Zehnder apparatus.
experimenter’s hands tremble [3] and so cannot have complete control on all the bits that describe
φ. This will be important in what is described below.
Recall that in classical physics, unit vectors in a real Hilbert space provide a natural quantity
to represent the uncertain state of a system when - e.g. when describing some future state. For
example, let i denote a unit vector representing the event a: it rains somewhere in London sometime
this coming Saturday. The orthogonal unit vector j can therefore represent the event a: it rains
nowhere in London at any time this coming Saturday. By Pythagoras’s theorem,
v(Pa) =
√
Pa i+
√
P
a
j
also has unit norm, for any probability assignment Pa that it will rain somewhere in London this
coming Saturday, and P
a
that it won’t. Hence, in this case, v(Pa) represents the uncertain state
of London’s weather this coming Saturday, where the probability that it will rain equals Pa. A
best estimate of Pa is given by an ensemble weather forecast for Saturday [24]. Such a forecast
may typically comprise 50 integrations of a numerical weather forecast model - itself encoding
the Navier-Stokes equations - each individual forecast being made from slightly different starting
conditions (consistent with the fact that available weather observations only define the starting
conditions imperfectly). Hence Pa = q/50 and Pa
= 1 − q/50 where q ≤ 50 denotes the number
of individual forecasts which predict rain over London on Saturday. Since each weather forecast
defines a trajectory of the classical equations of motion, Pa is defined by frequentism over the space
of 50 weather trajectories which lie, approximately, on Earth’s weather attractor in meteorological
state space. We can assume the real weather follows one of these trajectories - though which one is
uncertain until we have observed Saturday’s actual weather.
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By analogy, we can interpret the real Hilbert vector (3) in terms of an uncertain selection from
some finite string
{a1 a2 a3 . . . a2N } (5)
where ai ∈ {a, a}, N is a parameter to be described below, and a fraction cos2 θ/2 of the 2N
elements are a s, the remaining sin2 θ/2 2N elements being a s. Each element of the string labels
a state-space trajectory; ai = a if a photon is detected by Da, ai = a if the photon is detected by
D
a
. By definition, cos2 θ/2 and hence cos θ is describable by a finite number of bits. Hereafter, I
will use the phrase ‘finitely describable’ to mean ‘describable by a finite number of bits’. It will be
convenient to order the bits of (5) so that the first cos2 θ/2 of the 2N elements are a s.
The complex Hilbert vector (4) can be interpreted in a similarly realistic way. First let θ = pi/2
so that the first half of the elements of (5) are a s. Then define a cyclical permutation operator ζ
ζ{a1 a2 a3 . . . a2N } = {a2N a1 a2 . . . a2N−1} (6)
so that ζ2
N
is equal to the identity operator, i.e. ζ is a representation of a 2N th root of unity. We
can therefore write
ζ = e2pii/2
N
(7)
as an equivalent expression for the operator ζ. In this way, we will define (4) as an uncertain
selection of element from the bit string
ζn{a1 a2 a3 . . . a2N } (8)
where n = 2Nφ/2pi.
In order to avoid disrupting the flow of this Section too much, I summarise below a number
of important points to be made about these representations of (3) and (4), leaving more detailed
discussion to Sections 5, 11 and Appendix C.
• At a more fundamental level, this symbolic labelling of trajectories reflects the fact that each
trajectory is attracted to one of two distinct clusters on IU - labelled a and a - through a
deterministic chaotic (and hence nonlinear) process. These clusters therefore correspond to
measurement eigenstates. The parameter N is linked to this chaotic process, reflecting the
number of fractal iterates needed to evolve to one cluster or the other. In Section 11 we
speculate that this clustering of state-space trajectories is a manifestation of the phenomenon
of gravity.
• By the discussion above, a momentum measurement on IU is therefore associated with a
finitely describable cosφ. A position measurement on IU is associated with a finitely describ-
able φ/pi.
• The chaotic procedure which determines which particular element ai of (5) is selected, will
be sensitively dependent on the phase angle φ, even though the probability of selecting ai is
independent of φ. The selection procedure is periodic in φ.
• The bit-string representations of (3) and (4) are examples of bit-string representations of the
general single-qubit Hilbert vector cos θ2 |a〉 + eiφ sin θ2 |a〉 which is invariant under an SU(2)
transformation and hence reflects the underlying isotropy of space. As such, the underlying
symbolic labelling also reflects this isotropy. and is spontaneously broken by the clustering
procedure mentioned in the bullet above. A generalm-qubit state is represented bym partially
correlated bit strings.
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We now come to a number-theoretic result which is central to this paper:
Theorem [21, 13]. It is impossible for both φ/pi and cosφ to be simultaneously finitely describable
unless φ = 0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2 . . ..
An elementary proof is given in Appendix B.
A direct consequence of this theorem is the generic non-commutativity of position and momentum
measurements - the essence of quantum theory [11]. Suppose we perform a momentum measure-
ment with the Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Consider the following counterfactual question: Even
though in reality the experiment was a momentum measurement, could it have been a position mea-
surement? In asking this counterfactual question we will imagine that the supplementary variables
λ - including the moons of Jupiter - are held fixed. Now because in reality the first measurement
was a momentum measurement, the set of allowed orientations φ - corresponding to the set of
histories on IU - are those where cosφ is finitely describable. Assuming φ isn’t precisely one of the
four exceptions (very unlikely if 2N  4), we can scan through all the values of φ where cosφ is
finitely describable, and we will never find one where φ/pi is finitely describable. That is to say, a
counterfactual state of the universe corresponding to a position measurement does not and cannot
lie on the invariant set IU . Now suppose a second actual measurement with the interferometer
was a position measurement, i.e. where φ/pi is finitely describable. Then a second counterfactual
momentum measurement, i.e. where cosφ is finitely describable, necessarily lies off IU . This is turn
means that the order of the two measurements (the first momentum, the second position) could not
be reversed - the measurements are non-commutative, consistent with the Uncertainty Principle.
The finite describability of cosφ or φ/pi delineates two distinct types of invariant set structure
(‘momentum structure’ and ‘position structure’). Now as Bell noted, experimenters hands tremble
- they only have direct control on the leading bits of φ and therefore have no direct control, when
they set the dials on their instruments, on whether cosφ or φ/pi is finitely describable. That is to
say, whilst the experimenter is completely free to set as many or as few of the bits she can control
as she likes, she cannot directly control whether cosφ or φ/pi is finitely describable. Finite precision
is an important consistency condition for this theory: if experimenters could control all the bits of
φ, then they would be able to set φ/pi to be finitely describable in a situation where a momentum
measurement was being made (or cosφ to be finitely describable when a position measurement was
being made). This inconsistency is reminiscent of the inconsistency described in Section 2 which
would arise if the Laplacian demon could predict the future. In both cases the inconsistency is
avoided by the consequences of finite precision (in not being able to control whether cosφ or φ/pi is
finitely describable in the first instance, or not being able to predict the future in the second case).
Also crucial to the consistency of this picture is the use of the p-adic metric. In conventional
physical theory, it is an irrelevance whether or not cosφ is finitely describable: the standard Eu-
clidean distance between a universe where cosφ is finitely describable and one where it is not, can
be made as small as one likes. Since we require our theories to be structurally stable, a conventional
theory where these differences mattered would be considered unacceptably fine tuned because the
differences would be destroyed by arbitrarily Euclidean-small noise. However, as discussed, if the
counterfactual world U ′ where cosφ is not finitely describable lies off the invariant set, it cannot
be p-adically close to the real world U where cosφ is finitely describable (no matter how close
these worlds appear from a Euclidean perspective). As such, one cannot perturb the system off the
invariant set with p-adic-small amplitude noise. That is to say, the finitely describability of cosφ is
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structurally stable to p-adic noise.
As Bell has pointed out, the no-go theorems of quantum physics can tolerate a considerable
amount of hand trembling. Now hand trembling occurs in space-time, not in state space. We can
imagine that as the hand is on the dial, the actual φ realised at any time varies slightly from one
time to the next, where ‘slightly’ is meant in the sense that the Euclidean distance between any
two φ s is small. However, no amount of such trembling need violate the state-space constraint that
all elements of the time series of cosφs realised are finitely describable when the hand trembles on
the dial. As such, the counterfactual universe U ′ where cosφ is not finitely describable will never
be encountered, even momentarily, by any such hand trembling. Bell noted that quantification of
hand trembling ‘would require careful epsilonics’. As this discussion shows, such epsilonics must
carefully distinguish space-time epsilonics, where the measure of distance is Euclidean, from state-
space epsilons where the measure of distance is p-adic. There is a subtle interplay between these
different metrics when unravelling these matters.
Referring to a state-space trajectory as a history, then invariant set theory can be viewed as
a realistic ’consistent histories’ theory, although at a technical level this is quite different to the
conventional notion of Consistent Histories [11]. For example, here the word ’consistent’ has the
precise number-theoretic meaning discussed above: if a trajectory with finitely describable cosφ
lies on IU , then a trajectory with the same supplementary variables λ but with finitely describable
φ/pi is not a consistent history and does not lie on IU .
This number-theoretic notion of consistency in turn implies that the sample space Λx=0 of
supplementary variables λ associated with finitely describable cosφ must be disjoint from the sample
space Λx=1 of supplementary variables associated with finitely describable φ/pi. Hence, ρ(λ|x) 6=
ρ(λ), violating (2). A key point is that this is not superdeterminism by fiat (a criticism levelled at
other superdeterministic approaches), rather, it is emergent superdeterminism; emergent from this
number-theoretic consistent histories approach to complex Hilbert vectors.
Now if φ1/pi and φ2/pi are both finitely describable, then so is (φ1 − φ2)/pi. By the theorem of
Appendix B, ignoring the four exceptions, cos(φ1 − φ2)/2 is not finitely describable. Hence, from
the identity
1
2
(eiφ1 + eiφ2) = ei
φ1+φ2
2 cos
φ1 − φ2
2
(9)
on the field of complex numbers C, the multiplicative operators eiφ in (7) cannot be additive.
Fundamentally, it is this property that makes invariant set theory holistic. Without additivity, it
is not permissible to break up a system into sub-units. Despite this, it may be computationally
convenient to extend the set of angles φ/pi from those that are finitely describable to all angles on the
whole circle, allowing multiplication and addition of eiφ. Similarly, from a computational point of
view we may wish to extend the finitely allowable cosφ to the full set of reals on−1 ≤ cosφ ≤ 1. This
completion gives us us the algebraically closed complex Hilbert Space of quantum theory. However,
no ontological significance should be given to the extended set of states so formed: by construction,
they are there solely for computational convenience. Because the invariant set operators eiφ are not
additive for any finite N , they only become algebraic at the singular [5] limit N =∞. In Appendix
E we show how the relativistic form of the Schro¨dinger equation, the Dirac equation, can be viewed
as a dynamical evolution equation in invariant set theory, in the singular limit N =∞.
The analysis provides a novel realistic interpretation of the EPR experiment (one which has
nothing to do with Einstein-Rosen bridges [19], therefore suggesting that ER6=EPR). In the EPR
experiment, if Alice measures the position of her particle, then the position of the second particle
is determined. However, by the discussion above, it is not the case that that Alice, having actually
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measured position, might have measured momentum. Hence, it is not the case that the second par-
ticle must be prepared for the possibility that Alice might have measured momentum and therefore
must have a well-defined momentum.
The invariant set concept is holistic. If a point in cosmological state space does not lie on IU ,
then nothing about the universe associated with this point is real. It doesn’t matter a jot that
the two particles exist on opposite sides of the universe and do not interact. Any counterfactual
perturbation that leads Alice to measure momentum, takes the whole universe, including the moons
of Jupiter, off IU . In this sense the moons of Jupiter do care what experiment is conducted here
on Earth. However, nowhere do we need to invoke a breakdown of determinism or local causality
to explain this: the information about whether U is a state of physical reality is encoded in the
holistic but locally causal invariant set.
As discussed, the number-theoretic incommensurateness of φ/pi and cosφ encodes the uncer-
tainty principle. In this sense, this account of EPR does not reveal any inconsistency with the
uncertainty principle - indeed invariant set theory provides a rational explanation for it. However,
because the state space of quantum theory is an algebraically complete vector space (consistent with
the singular limit at N = ∞), quantum theory itself cannot discriminate between physically real
states on the invariant set, and physically unreal states off the invariant set; its square-integrable
functional form is too coarse-grain to provide such discrimination. This is essentially why quantum
theory can never be considered a realistic theory. In this sense, I agree with EPR that the wave
function does not and cannot provide a complete description of physical reality.
These issues will be revisited in a more precise way when discussing the Bell Theorem in Section
6.
5 Probability vs Frequency of Outcome
Above, we have interpreted the Hilbert vectors (3) and (4) as an uncertain selection from a sample
space of neighbouring trajectories on IU in state space. However, in quantum theory the squared
amplitudes of these Hilbert vectors also describe frequencies of occurrence of sequences of outcomes
of similarly-prepared experiments in our unique space-time (i.e. relative to one particular his-
tory). The relationship between probability and frequency of occurrence can often be conceptually
problematic in physical theory [47]; but not so with fractal geometry.
To understand this, I need to outline how self-similar structure manifests itself on IU . Fig 3,
starting at t = t0 at the bottom of the Figure, shows what appears to be a single trajectory or
history, i.e. an element of Ci(2) × R for some iterate number i. However, looking through the
magnifying glass the trajectory in fact comprises 2N trajectories - shown (and reminsicent of DNA)
with a compact helical structure (c.f. Appendix E). Between t1 and t2 these trajectories diverge
chaotically into two state space clusters (described in more detail in Section 10) and the labelling
above describes whether or not a trajectory evolves to cluster a or cluster a as a result of this chaotic
evolution. The parameter N describes the number of iterates of C(2) that it takes to describe the
clustering process between t1 and t2 and defines the strength of the chaotic dynamics that operates
during the clustering procedure (see Sections 10 and 11). The physical reason for such instability
can be related to the phenomenon of decoherence: on different nearby trajectories, the system
interacts in different ways with its environment. As these differences grow, the trajectories diverge
more from one another. In Section 10, I relate these clusters to measurement eigenstates and In
Section 11, I speculate that the clustering process is a manifestation of the phenomenon of gravity.
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Figure 3: A schematic illustration of state-space trajectories or histories (each a cosmological space-
time projected into 2D) on the invariant set IU , here represented locally as C(2) × R. Periods of
chaotic evolution (between t1 and t2 and between t3 and t4) correspond to what would conventionally
be referred to as periods of decoherence as the system interacts nonlinearly with its environment.
Here the state-space clusters a, a, b and b, to which the trajectories on IU are attracted, correspond
to eigenstates of the relevant observable in standard quantum theory but are associated with deter-
ministic riddled basin dynamics in invariant set theory (see Section 10). A given trajectory, under
N -iterate magnification, reveals a neighbourhood comprising 2N trajectories, consistent with the
self-similar structure of C(2).
16
If we take one of the trajectories of Ci+N (2) × R (e.g. between t2 and t3), by self similarity it
can also be seen to comprise a set of 2N trajectories (of Ci+2N (2)× R) which undergoes a further
period of chaotic evolution, between t3 and t4. And so on and so on.
A point X ∈ C(p) can be represented by the p-adic integer ...x3x2x1. where xi ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . p−
1}. Here xi defines the segment of the ith iterate of C(p) in which X lies. C(p) comes with a
natural measure: the Haar Measure. With respect to this measure, the probability that xi equals
any of the digits in {0, 1, 2, . . . p − 1} is the same and equal to 1/p. The following theorem relates
probability to frequency of occurrence.
Theorem [39] Let X be a typical element of a Cantor set C(p), i.e. an element drawn randomly
with respect to the Haar measure. Then with probability one, the frequency of occurrence of any
of the digits {0, 1, 2, . . . p− 1} in the expansion for X is equal to 1/p.
Hence, by Ruban’s theorem with p = 2, if the probability of a typical trajectory being attracted
to the a cluster is equal to q/2N , then the frequency of occurrence of the a cluster in a long sequence
of similarly-prepared experiments (i.e. instability/cluster pairs) in any one trajectory is also q/2N .
The relationship between probability and frequency of occurrence is straightforward in a fractal
setting.
6 The Bell Theorem
The discussion on EPR in Section 4 is relevant to the Bell Theorem. As above, suppose Alice
chooses between x = 0 or x = 1 and Bob y = 0 or y = 1. A pair of values (x, y) imply a
pair of spin measurements on pairs of entangled particles, where the measuring apparatuses have
relative orientation θxy. If x and y are considered as points on S2, then θxy is the angular distance
between x and y. In Appendix Cwe extend the analysis in Section 4 to show how to interpret the
tensor-product Hilbert state
|ψab〉 = γ0|a〉|b〉+ γ1eiχ1 |a〉|b〉+ γ2eiχ2 |a〉|b〉+ γ3eiχ3 |a〉|b〉, (10)
where γi, χi ∈ R and γ20 + γ21 + γ22 + γ23 = 1, as an uncertain selection of a pair of elements {ai, bi}
from the bit strings
Sa = {a1 a2 . . . a2N }
Sb = {b1 b2 . . . b2N } (11)
where ai ∈ {a, a}, bi ∈ {b}. This interpretation is only possible if γ2i and χi/pi are finitely de-
scribable. That is to say, the mapping from bit-string space to Hilbert Space is an injection. As
discussed in Appendix C, this implies cos θxy must be finitely describable.
Suppose Alice and Bob choose some particular pair (x, y), so that {λ, x, y} describes a universe
on IU . Then, based on the finite describability of cos θxy the following can be shown:
• The counterfactual universe {λ, 1 − x, 1 − y} also lies on IU - this history is consistent with
{λ, x, y} as far as invariant set theory is concerned. That is to say, if cos θxy is finitely
describable, then so too is cos θ(1−x)(1−y).
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• The counterfactual universes {λ, x, 1 − y} and {λ, 1 − x, y} (almost certainly) do not lie on
IU - these histories are inconsistent with {λ, x, y} as far as invariant set theory is concerned.
That is to say, if cos θxy is finitely describable, then cos θ(1−x)y and cos θx(1−y) are not finitely
describable.
• Let z = x+ y mod 2. Then, the set Λz=0 of supplementary variables λ consistent with z = 0
must be disjoint from the set Λz=1 of supplementary variables λ consistent with z = 1.
The reasons for these conclusions combine geometry and number theory. Fig 4 shows, separately
for Λz=0 and Λz=1, the choices x = 0, x = 1, y = 0 and y = 1 represented as four points on the
2-sphere. The lines represent great circles and are solid if cos θxy can be finitely described, and
dashed otherwise. The left-hand figure corresponds to the sample Λz=0 and hence measurements
where either x = 0 and y = 0, or x = 1 and y = 1. Here cos θ00 and cos θ11 are finitely describable,
and cos θ01 and cos θ10 not. The reason why the latter are not finitely describable is discussed
in Appendix D and makes use of the theory of Pythagorean triples - specifically that there are
no Pythagorean Triples {a, b, c} where c is a power of 2.The right-hand figure corresponds to the
sample Λz=1 and hence measurements where either x = 0 and y = 1, or x = 1 and y = 0. Here
cos θ01 and cos θ10 are finitely describable, and cos θ00 and cos θ11 not. Of conceptual importance
is the implication that the precise position of the four points cannot be absolutely identical in the
left and right-hand figures. However, to within any finite experimental precision, the position of
the four points can be considered identical. Like quantum interferometry, this violation of the Bell
inequality relies on finite experimental precision. As discussed in Section 4, these results are robust
to p-adic noise and hence structurally stable.
The CHSH inequality is
|C(0, 0) + C(0, 1) + C(1, 0)− C(1, 1)| ≤ 2 (12)
where
C(x, y) = p(a = b|x, y)− p(a 6= b|x, y) (13)
Experimentally, each correlation is determined by a separate sub-ensemble of particles: let’s say
the first correlation is determined on Monday, the second on Tuesday and so on. Then, based on
the results above, in any experiment which seeks to test the CHSH inequality, the supplementary
variables λ must necessarily be drawn from the two disjoint samples: Λz=0 (from which Monday
and Thursday’s sub-ensembles are drawn) and Λz=1 (from which Tuesday and Wednesday’s sub-
ensembles are drawn).
For supplementary variables drawn from Λz=0 (left hand figure), the bit-string construction
discussed in Appendix C provides us with four bit strings, S0(x = 0), S0(x = 1), S0(y = 0),
S0(y = 1), each of length 2
N , such that
• Each of S0(x = 0), S0(x = 1), S0(y = 0) and S0(y = 1) has an equal number of 0s and 1s.
• The correlation between S0(x = 0) and S0(y = 0) is equal to − cos θ00, by construction finitely
describable.
• The correlation between S0(x = 1) and S0(y = 1) is equal to − cos θ11, by construction finitely
describable.
• Because cosφ01 and cosφ10 are not finitely describable when Λz=0, the correlations between
S0(x = 0) and S0(y = 1), and between S0(x = 1) and S0(y = 0) do not correspond to
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anything physically realisable on IU - they do not correspond to correlations on entangled
particle measurements in an experiment to test the CHSH inequality.
Similarly, for supplementary variables drawn from Λz=1 (right-hand figure) we similarly have
four bit strings, S1(x = 0), S1(x = 1), S1(y = 0), S1(y = 1), independent of the S0 bit strings
above, such that
• Each of S1(x = 0), S1(x = 1), S1(y = 0), S1(y = 1) has an equal number of 0s and 1s.
• The correlation between S1(x = 0) and S1(y = 1) is equal to − cos θ01 by construction finitely
describable.
• The correlation between S1(x = 1) and S1(y = 0) is equal to − cos θ10, by construction finitely
describable.
• Because cosφ00 and cosφ11 are not finitely describable when Λz=1, the correlations between
S1(x = 0) and S0(y = 0), and between S1(x = 1) and S0(y = 1) do not correspond to
anything physically realisable on IU - they do not correspond to correlations on entangled
particle measurements in an experiment to test the CHSH inequality.
Since C(x, y) = − cos θxy on IU , invariant set theory violates the Bell inequality as does quan-
tum theory. Formally, it can do this because of superdeterminism: Λz=0 is disjoint from Λz=1.
However, this is not ad hoc superdeterminism, but superdeterminism emergent from our number-
theoretic/fractal geometric approach to consistent histories. This raises an important point. The
need to mention here (and in Section 4) the reality or otherwise of certain counterfactual worlds
may seem puzzling to some. After all, modern accounts of Bell’s theorem (e.g. [7]) make no mention
at all about the notion of counterfactual reality - as such the notion may seem an irrelevance. Why,
then, does counterfactuality seem to play such a crucial role in the invariant set model’s evasion of
Bell inequalities? The answer is that, as mentioned, in the invariant set model, superdeterminism
does not arise by fiat, it is a consequence of deeper number-theoretic/fractal geometric principles.
Presenting (2) as axiomatic (or, at least, not acknowledging that it might arise, or fail, from some-
thing deeper) is again prejudicial, because it immediately suggests that any failure of (2) is ad hoc.
Although modern accounts of Bell’s theorem are very compact, I believe that this compactness is
a hindrance to the emergence of physically plausible alternatives to quantum theory.
The transcendental property of the cosine function is essential if invariant set theory is to violate
the CHSH inequality. For example, suppose the invariant set’s correlations were given instead by
some F (θ), where F was a polynomial with finitely describable coefficients. Then if both F (θ1) and
F (θ2) were finitely describable, so too would be F (θ1 + θ2). In this case, the argument for disjoint
sample spaces Λz=0 and Λz=1 would fail. In turn, the model would have to be constrained by the
CHSH inequality (i.e. be essentially classical) and would therefore be inconsistent with experiment.
With such polynomial functions, it would also be possible to create sub-systems, and the essential
holism of the model would also fail.
It is well known that it is possible to concoct ‘superquantum’ theories where the CHSH inequality
is violated more that does quantum theory [34, 45]. Could one concoct a type of invariant set theory
in which the CHSH inequalities are maximally violated? The answer depends on whether there exist
other transcendental functions T (in addition to the cosine function) such that if T (θ1) and T (θ2)
are finitely describable, then T (θ1 + θ2) is almost certainly not, and where T (0) = 1, T (pi/2) = 0,
T (pi) = −1. The failure to find an alternative suitable transcendental correlation function would
provide a new approach to understanding the Tsirelson bound.
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Figure 4: Alice and Bob’s choices x = 0, x = 1, y = 0 and y = 1 associated with measurement
options for a CHSH experiment, shown schematically as four points on the 2-sphere. The lines
between these points actually represent great circles where the angular distance between x and y
is θxy. Where the lines are solid (dashed), the corresponding cosines of the angular distances are
(are not) finitely describable for number-theoretic reasons (see Appendix D). In a), corresponding
to the sample space Λz=0 of supplementary variables, where z = x+ y mod 2, cos θ00 and cos θ11
are finitely describable. In b), corresponding to the disjoint sample space Λz=1 of supplementary
variables, cos θ01 and cos θ10 are finitely describable. This means that the precise positions of the x
and y points in the left- and right-hand panels are not identical. However, to within the necessarily
finite precision of the measurement orientations corresponding to the x and y button pushes, these
points can be treated in any practical sense as if they are identical. In both figures, the cosines
of the angular distances between x = 0 and x = 1, and between y = 0 and y = 1 are finitely
describable because it is always possible to measure a particle pressing x and then re-inject the
particle into the measuring device pressing button 1− x (and similarly for y and 1− y).
20
7 Random Bits and Free Will
As discussed, if U is a universe on IU where x = 0 and y = 0, then the counterfactual universe U
′
with the same supplementary variables λ, but where x = 1 and y = 0, does not lie on IU . Let us
suppose that x is set by Bell’s pseudo-random number generator, i.e. the value of the millionth bit
in U is a 0, and the value of the millionth bit in U ′ is a 1. If U lies on IU at the time x is set,
then it also lies on IU at the earlier time the million-digit variable is input to the pseudo random
number generator. This is true, not because of any notion of retrocausality [35], because the notion
of dynamical invariance is necessarily independent of time: if a state lies on the invariant set now,
it always has lain on it, and always will lie on it. Similarly, if a state does not lie on IU now it
never has lain on it and never will lie on it. In particular U ′ did not lie on IU when the million-
digit variable with its last counterfactually-flipped bit was input to the pseudo-random number
generator.
The reason, then, why Bell’s argument about physical randomisers may be incorrect is that
in this invariant set theoretic approach, the difference between U and U ′ at the time the million-
digit variable was input to the pseudo-random number generator is not (2-adically) small. Indeed,
reducing the bit which sets x from a millionth to a trillionth will not affect the 2-adic distance of
U ′ from IU one jot (even though it makes the Euclidean distance smaller). Bell [3] recognised that
his arguments were not water tight, commenting:
Of course it might be that these reasonable ideas about physical randomisers are just
wrong- for the purposes at hand. A theory may appear in which such conspiracies
inevitably occur, and these conspiracies may then seem more digestible than the non-
localities of other theories. When that theory is announced, I will not refuse to listen,
either on methodological or other grounds.
As discussed above, there are no conspiracies in invariant set theory: there is nothing secretive
about the invariant set, even though many of its properties may be non-computable.
In contemporary attempts to test (2), x and y are often set by for-all-practical-purposes random
bits rather than direct experimenter choices e.g. [40] extracted bits from the movie Back to the
Future. Exactly the same arguments as used above apply to these movie bits. Hence, if a certain
bit of the movie determines x, then flipping the bit keeping the supplementary variables λ fixed,
takes the whole state of the universe off the invariant set to a non-ontological state of physical
unreality. If {λ, x = 0} denotes a state of the universe on IU , where the relevant movie bit from
Back to the Future is a 0, then {λ, x = 1} denotes the state U ′ which does not lie on IU . As
before, consistent with the holism of the theory, none of the components of U ′, such as the moons
of Jupiter, have physical reality. Their reality (and that of all the clusters of galaxies in distant
parts of the universe) can be obliterated at an instant by just counterfactually flipping that one
movie bit - as discussed, p-adically this bit flip is not a small-amplitude perturbation. The fact
that these moons and clusters are spacelike separated from the place where the counterfactual bit
flip occurs is a complete irrelevance because the counterfactual bit flip violates a global state-space
constraint (that states of reality lie on a global invariant set). This discussion can be thought of
as an illustration of the Takens embedding theorem in dynamical systems theory [42]: the whole
invariant set can be constructed from a sufficiently long time series of just one component of the
invariant set, even if that component is spatially localised and energetically insignificant.
Suppose at the last minute, the experimenters decide that x and y will be determined by bits
from Jaws rather than Back to the Future. Can we still say that counterfactually flipping the bit
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from Back to the Future will cause the state of the universe to move off the invariant set? No
we can’t, because now the bit from Back to the Future is no longer the determinant to a future
experiment involving non-commutative operators. Hence, we can no longer invoke the deterministic
invariance argument that because counterfactually flipping x = 0 to x = 1 takes the universe off
the invariant set, counterfactually flipping the Back to the Future bit must necessarily do the same.
As discussed, Bell used randomisers as a way to avoid discussing the contentious metaphysics
of human free will. However, fundamentally, there are no new issues to discuss if we replace these
randomisers with human brains. Human cognition can be just as susceptible to pseudo-random
(but ultimately deterministic) processes inside the brain, as does Bell’s pseudo-random number
generator. These arise not least because of the extreme slenderness of human axons, making the
protein transistors which amplify electric signals propagating along these axons, subject to thermal
noise [38]. Indeed this susceptibility, born out of a need for the brain with its hundred-billion
neurons to be outstandingly energy efficient (it operates with the power needed to light a domestic
light bulb), could be what makes us creative [25]. If the decision to measure x = 0 rather than x = 1
depends sensitively on the action of one of these protein transistors, then the consequences for lying
on the invariant set in the counterfactual world where a particular ion failed to activate a particular
protein transistor, are no different to the pseudo-random number bits and movie bits that have
been discussed above. As has been argued by such eminent philosophers as Thomas Hobbes, David
Hulme and John Stuart Mill [14], our sense of free will merely reflects an absence of constraints
preventing us from doing what we want to do. From this point of view, neither determinism nor
indeed superdeterminism is an impediment to free will. Positing superdeterminism as a constraint
on free will is simplistic and unnecessarily restrictive on the class of superdeterministic theories.
In Appendix F, I discuss the PBR Theorem [36] from this superdeterministic perspective (where
violation of Measurement Independence is traded for violation of Preparation Independence).
I do not think it will ever be possible to test the Measurement Independence assumption directly
in these Bell test experiments. We have to find other ways. These may involve experimental studies,
or direct cosmological observations, where the effects of neither quantum nor gravitational physics
are negligible. We briefly address such matters below.
8 Fooled by Our Genes?
Let me address a question I have been asked by one eminent quantum foundations expert. Why
would nature be so incredibly devious to lead us, a seemingly intelligent species capable of some
astonishing achievements in both the arts and the sciences, to be so comprehensively fooled into
thinking that the world around us is not locally real, when it actually is?
Actually I do not believe nature is the least bit devious. Rather, I believe we have been fooled
by our genes. Consider our first experiences as human beings. A baby in the cot sees a colourful toy.
For one or more reasons, she is genetically programmed to be attracted to such colourful objects,
and so instinctively wants to explore the toy further. To do this, she has to get a part of her body
(typically mouth and/or hands) in close proximity to the toy. In so doing, she implicitly learns a
fundamental fact about the nature of physical space: closeness is synonymous with smallness of
Euclidean distance. If this sense of spatial awareness is the first thing we learn as humans, it may be
the hardest thing to let go of, when, in later life, we come to explore more abstract spaces, notably
state spaces. Hence, when the philosopher David Lewis says that one world is closer to actuality
than another if the first resembles the actual world more than the second does (c.f. Section 3), I
believe Lewis is inadvertently misapplying intuitive ideas learned in the cot.
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Ironic then that a theoretically sound class of theory has been rejected, supposedly because of
concerns about subversion from effects worse than alien mind control, but in fact because our minds
have been comprehensively subverted by something much closer to home - gene control!
9 Invariant Set Theory vs Cellular Automaton Theory
It was mentioned in Section 2 that there is a notable exception to the community’s rejection of
superdeterminism [43, 44]. ’t Hooft argues that it is possible to formulate a classical model of the real
world which underpins quantum physics. He proposes a realistic deterministic cellular automaton
dynamical system in place of the Schrdinger equation. This system is presumed to describe the
evolution of the world with respect to in a unique ‘ontological basis’. The types of counterfactual
worlds discussed above are deemed unrealistic simply because, by fiat, the corresponding basis is
not ontological.
There is a fundamental theoretical difference between cellular automaton theory and invariant
set theory. As a model of quantum physics, cellular automaton theory requires two separate el-
ements: a deterministic (Schro¨dinger-like) dynamical evolution equation, D, and a constraint on
possible initial conditions I. In classical theories (which includes ’tHooft’s theory), the dynamical
laws of evolution and the initial conditions from which future states evolve, are largely independent
of one another. For example, the classical Lorenz equations [18] can be integrated from any point
in the Euclidean state space R3 of the model. In classical theory, we can constrain the initial state
to some region of state space, e.g. X ≥ 0, but such a constraint must be applied independently
of, and in addition to, the dynamical equations themselves. To constrain initial conditions ’t Hooft
considers the special nature of the early universe [44]:
. . . even in a superdeterministic world, contradictions with Bell’s theorem would ensue
if it would be legal to consider a change of one or a few bits in the beables describing
Alice’s world, without making any modifications in Bob’s world. . . . [However,] it is easy
to observe that, certainly in the distant past, the effects of such a modification would be
enormous and it may never be compatible with a simple low-entropy Big Bang . . . Thus,
we can demand in our theory that a modification of just a few beables in Alice’s world
without any changes in Bob’s world is fundamentally illegal. This is how an ontological
deterministic model can ‘conspire’ to violate Bell’s theorem.
There are similarities with the arguments above. However, notwithstanding the fact that the
reasons for the low-entropy of the early universe remain controversial [31], ’tHooft’s model raises a
conceptual problem: Why has nature chosen to constrain both D to be Schro¨dinger like, and at the
same time, only permitted a single initial state, the ontological initial state? Of course without the
constraint on I, the Bell inequalities would not be violated, and without the constraint on D, we
would observe basic quantum phenomena like black body radiation. Hence, both these constraints
are necessary to account the world around us. But why both? There seems to be something
unnecessarily complex and theoretically perplexing that we have to invoke two seemingly separate
and independent constraints to arrive at a description of the observed world.
In invariant theory, D and I are not independent. They are both subservient to the underpinning
fractal geometry of the invariant set. That is to say, consistent with invariant set theory not being
a classical theory, there aren’t two separate constraints, but only one: the geometry of IU . For
this reason, invariant set theory is conceptually a simpler theory than cellular automaton theory.
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Figure 5: A schematic of a typical situation where a system is prepared in some initial state and
subject to a transformation and measurement. From [12]
Indeed, rather than relying on the low entropy of the early universe, as discussed in Section 11, it
is possible that the low entropy of the early universe may in fact be derivable from properties of
the invariant set.
10 Riddled Basins, The Schro¨dinger Equation as a Singular
Limit, and Why Stochasticity Fails.
The discussion so far has mostly been about the kinematics of the invariant set. How do we describe
dynamical evolution? To frame the problem, let us use the canonical experimental situation where
a system is prepared by a device with a knob for varying the state of the system produced and a
release button for releasing the system, a transformation device for transforming the state (and a
knob to vary the transformation), and a measuring apparatus for measuring the state (with a knob
to vary what is measured) which outputs classical information. See Fig 5 (from [12]).
In invariant set theory, this experimental situation is described graphically by one of the tra-
jectories in Fig 3 which, let’s say, belongs to the a cluster at time t2 (i.e. quantum mechanically,
is prepared in the |a〉 state at t2) and belongs to either the b cluster or the b cluster at time t3
(i.e. quantum mechanically, reduces to the |b〉 or |b〉 state at t3). This description is consistent
with the notion that in invariant set theory the most primitive expression of the laws of physics is
a description of the geometry of the invariant set IU in state space.
In invariant set theory, dynamical evolution associated with divergence and clustering are as-
sociated with deterministic processes. It is known that unpredictable evolution towards multiple
attractors can be described deterministically by so-called riddled-basin dynamics [1]. This arises
when a chaotic oscillator is coupled to a model with multiple potential wells. With such coupling,
the basin boundaries can become fractally intertwined and it is generally unpredictable whether the
system lies in one basin of attraction or another other. Chaotic evolution can be based on nonlinear
p-adic mappings, much like the logistic maps on R [50]. Here is enough to utilise a simple Bernoulli
or binary shift map - a type of logistic map - on the 2-adic bits representing a state on IU . This
shift map would generate the divergence of trajectories shown in Fig 3, and the grouping into the
two clusters b and b is then consistent with two riddled basins of attraction on the invariant set.
The parameter N describes the number of iterations of the binary shift needed to lead to evolu-
tion to a cluster. With N large, the fate of an individual trajectory at t2 is unpredictable. This
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evolution is reminiscent of the notion of ‘objective reduction’ in quantum physics. However, such a
description would be misleading because invariant set theory does not assume any fundamental on-
tological significance to the superposed Hilbert state, and hence, as such, no ‘reduction’ is actually
taking place. Rather, the riddled-basin procedure combines a quasi-linear instability process, which
separates nearby trajectories on IU due to way in which neighbouring histories interact with their
environment (i.e. decohere) and with a nonlinear clustering process. In Section 11 I speculate that
the clustering (or ’clumping’) of trajectories in state space is a manifestation of the phenomenon
we call gravity.
In the literature, objective representations of the measurement procedure have been described by
stochastic mathematics [26, 10, 33]. However, in this framework, conventional stochastic dynamics
would completely destroy the properties of the invariant set which allow it to violate the Bell
Theorem in a locally causal context. This may at first sight seem surprising given that stochasticity
makes no difference to the interpretation of the Bell inequalities for conventional hidden-variable
models, if the dynamics of these models is deterministic or stochastic [4]. However, here, if the
measure-zero nature of the invariant set is stochastically smeared out onto the full measure of the
Euclidean space in which IU is embedded, then the model will no longer have the property that a
small (in the Euclidean sense) perturbation can take a point on the invariant set off it.
The preparation procedure can be viewed in a similar way. As a result of the preparation
procedure, the system, at the time of preparation, lies in one of the state-space clusters associated
with preparation (a and a). When the system is released, it emerges from the preparation procedure
with (say) the property ‘I have originated from cluster a’.
In quantum theory, the transformation from |a〉 to either |b〉 or |b〉 is given by the Schro¨dinger
equation. In Appendix E we show how the simplest form of the Dirac equation arises in invariant set
theory in the singular limit [5] N =∞. For finite N , time evolution of the bit strings S are effected
by the cyclical permutation operator ζ described in (6). Because ζ2
N
Sb = Sb, this evolution is
inherently oscillatory in time. A key physical relationship associated with the Schro¨dinger equation
is between the frequency of this oscillation and the mass and hence energy of the associated particle:
E = ~ω. With energy having an expression in terms of space-time curvature through the field
equations of general relativity, this can be seen as an example of a fundamental relationship
Expression for a property of the locally
Euclidean space-time geometry MU =
Expression for a property of the locally
p-adic state-space geometry IU
(14)
with Planck’s constant providing the basic constant of nature that translates properties of state-
space geometry into properties of space-time geometry. We discuss further possible implications of
this relationship in Section 11.
In quantum theory, the Schro¨dinger equation provides the dynamical underpinning for the trans-
formation phase of Fig 5. The equation has of course proven exceptionally accurate. Hence, rather
than add extra terms to this equation, invariant set theory provides restrictions on the equation
by not allowing the full Hilbert Space of states but only an algebraically open subset (where com-
plex phases are finitely describable multiples of pi and where space-time orientations have finitely
describable cosines). This restriction does not destroy the Schro¨dinger equation’s key property of
describing conservation of probability (just as the classical Liouville equation still describes con-
servation of probability when state-space trajectories are restricted to a fractal attractor). The
precise linearity of the Schro¨dinger equation reflects this conservation of probability, and this lin-
earity is not in any way perturbed by the presence of the highly nonlinear riddled-basin dynamics
discussed above (just as the linearity of the Liouville equation in classical physics is not challenged
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by underpinning nonlinear dynamical evolution).
This suggests a new interpretation of the Schro¨dinger equation: as a computationally power-
ful tool, but one whose functional analytic form is too coarse grained to be able to distinguish
ontological and non-ontological states, and therefore too coarse grained to describe quantum ontol-
ogy. Partial analogies arise in classical physics where it is computationally convenient to represent
properties of some fundamentally discrete system, e.g. molecules of a fluid, using variables drawn
from the reals, e.g. the fluid variables of the Navier-Stokes equation. However, there is a crucial
difference between this classical situation and the one proposed here. In classical physics we use
the Euclidean metric in both space time and state space. Hence the continuum approximation is
arbitrarily good if the mean free path of molecules between collisions is small enough. However,
in invariant set theory, with its use of the p-adic metric as a yardstick of distance in state space,
this is no longer true. In the latter framework at the ontological level, it does matter whether we
are dealing with the original discrete variables or the more computationally convenient continuum
variables, no matter how large the (finite) parameter N . In particular, a realistic theory based on
continuum variables must necessarily be nonlocal in order to violate the Bell inequalities.
In this sense, one can interpret the quantum potential of Bohmian theory as a coarse-grained L2
representation of the invariant set in configuration space. Again, with such a realistic representation,
the Bohmian quantum potential does not have the fine-grained ontological properties of the invariant
set and therefore Bohmian theory has to be explicitly nonlocal.
11 Quantum Gravity and the Dark Universe - The End of
Particle Physics?
The primary motivation for developing the model above was based on a growing belief that the fun-
damental impediment to synthesising quantum and gravitational physics is in fact quantum theory
[28]. If a causal geometric model of quantum physics can be developed, it may, superdeterministic
or not, stand a much greater chance of being synthesised with Einstein’s causal geometric model of
gravity, than does quantum theory. Here I wish to suggest some possible implications of invariant
set theory for such a synthesis. The remarks below are, of course, very speculative.
As discussed, the geometric basis of the proposed superdeterministic model is of a fractal invari-
ant set in the state space of the universe. Such invariant sets (e.g. the Lorenz attractor), comprise
just one indefinitely long trajectory wrapped up in a compact set. By comparison then, IU com-
prises the trajectory of a mono-universe (i.e. not a multiverse) evolving over multiple epochs on
a similar compact set. From this perspective, the sample space of neighbouring trajectories over
which probabilities are defined, merely define instances of our universe at earlier or later epochs.
There are no ‘Many Worlds’ as in the Everett interpretation - just one. Whether the universe is
open or closed is currently an unresolved question; it appears to be on the borderline. The theory
proposed here suggests an underlying finite and hence closed universe.
Continuing the notion of finiteness, although the discussion so far has assumed that IU is
precisely fractal, there is nothing in the theory that would prevent IU from being a sufficiently
complex finite limit cycle (that approximates well a fractal). That is to say, it could be that the
self-similarity discussed above, only persists to some large but finite number of iterations.
By treating the geometry of IU as a primitive expression of the laws of physics, then, as suggested
by (14), we can expect that the pseudo Riemannian geometry of our space time is influenced by the
fractal geometry of IU . That is to say, the geometry of space time should be partially influenced by
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the geometry of neighbouring state-space space-times (i.e. our universe at later or earlier epochs).
Could this provide an explanation of dark matter in our space time? That is to say, could it be that
what we call dark matter in our space-time, is merely ordinary matter on neighbouring space-time
trajectories on IU , whose influence on our space time arises from the particular geometric form of
IU?
Indeed, following (14), perhaps the curvature of space-time is intimately linked to the clustering
of trajectories on IU as shown in Fig 3. This would suggest, consistent with earlier speculations
by Penrose [29] and Dio´si [8]), that gravity should itself be an intrinsically decoherent process. An
experimental confirmation of this would provide a strong indication that the conventional quantum
field theory approach to quantum gravity is misguided. Now this clustering is certainly a nonlinear
process, and therefore would not occur if differences in space-time energy were sufficiently small.
This idea can be made quantitative. If EG denote the gravitational self energy of the difference
between mass/energy distributions in two space-times [30], then these space-times can be considered
gravitationally indistinct (over a time interval τ) if∫
τ
EGdt < ~ (15)
Two space-times that are sufficiently similar would then be gravitationally indistinct. One can
speculate that two space-times which differ merely by vacuum fluctuations would be gravitationally
indistinct in this sense. This would imply that vacuum fluctuations do not couple to gravity and
this can help explain why the cosmological constant is not 120 orders of magnitude bigger than
it is. The value that the cosmological constant does take may be the cosmological consequence of
(14), together with the generic and ubiquitous divergence of trajectories on IU (shown in Fig 3).
This provides a new proposal for the origin of dark energy in MU .
If the ideas above are correct, there will be no quantum field theoretic excitation (i.e. ‘particle’)
associated with either dark matter or dark energy. Indeed there will additionally be no such particle
as a graviton. Invariant set theory, if correct, implies a limit to the ability of particle physics to
explain everything we see in the world around us and indeed may signal the end of particle physics
beyond the Standard Model. However, the Standard Model has been extraordinarily successful
in explaining non-gravitational physics. What role does that model have in invariant set theory?
I would argue that the gauge groups of the Standard Model define the state space in which IU
is embedded. From this perspective it would be conceptually wrong to imagine gravity as some
extension of the Standard Model’s gauge-group structure, e.g. as some kind of Yang-Mills theory.
Rather we should think of gravity as the geometric phenomenon of clustering or clumping of histories
on the non-trivial fractal measure-zero geometry in the space spanned by the degrees of freedom of
the Standard Model’s gauge group.
One of the reasons for developing a so-called quantum theory of gravity is that it will eliminate
the occurrence of space-time singularities. Equation (14), whereby neighbouring state-space tra-
jectories influence our space-time, could also eliminate singularities by smearing out what would
otherwise be a delta function in curvature in our space time (corresponding to the singular limit
at N = ∞), into a finite gaussian-like function (at finite but large N) with support on some
neighbourhood of histories in state space.
The notion of a fractal invariant set has many interesting implications for the perplexing ques-
tion of time asymmetry and the Second Law of Thermodynamics. The growth of entropy from the
early phase of a cosmological epoch would, as in standard chaotic dynamics, be associated with the
generic divergence of trajectories shown in Fig 3. What causes the low entropy at the beginning of
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a cosmological epoch? In invariant set theory, it must be associated with state-space convergence
of trajectories in the late phase of the previous epoch (and hence nothing to do with inflation). In
conventional nonlinear dynamics, such convergence is typically associated with dissipation. How-
ever, here we would need to find something more fundamental. Penrose [31] has speculated that
such state-space convergence would generically be associated with the formation of black holes -
more generally of collapse towards a final-time singularity (a quasi-singularity from the paragraph
above). It is this process of state-space convergence that gives rise to the lacunae which allow
invariant set theory to violate Bell inequalities in the laboratory today.
These ideas in turn have implications and new perspectives on the problem of black-hole infor-
mation loss: in invariant set theory information is not lost, but is compressed to the extent that
the information, like vacuum fluctuations, no longer has a distinct gravitational signature. The in-
formation reacquires its gravitational signature during the divergence phase when entropy is again
increasing.
As mentioned, these remarks are speculative. However, they illustrate the fact that the devel-
opment of a superdeterminstic theory of quantum physics may open up some very new ways of
thinking about some of the deepest problems of contemporary fundamental physics.
12 Conclusions
It is time for superdeterminism and the corresponding Measurement Independence assumption to
be reappraised. Visceral arguments should be replaced with more logical and reasoned arguments.
A key part of this reappraisal is the role the p-adic metric plays as the yardstick of choice in state
space. The implications are potentially enormous, not only for our understanding of quantum
physics, but even more for resolving many of the conceptual difficulties that seem to be creating a
crisis of understanding in contemporary foundational physics.
Following the Shalm et al experiments, media headlines proclaimed that the Einstein/Bohr
debate has finally been settled in favour of Bohr. The theory described in this paper provides a
meeting ground for both Einstein and Bohr’s views and suggests that the the result of the debate
may in fact be a dead heat.
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A p-adic Integers and Cantor Sets
By way of introduction to the p-adic numbers, consider the sequence
{1, 1.4, 1.41., 1.414, 1.4142, 1.41421 . . .}
where each number is an increasingly accurate rational approximation to
√
2. As is well known,
this is a Cauchy sequence relative to the Euclidean metric d(a, b) = |a− b|, a, b ∈ Q.
Surprisingly perhaps, the sequence
{1, 1 + 2, 1 + 2 + 22, 1 + 2 + 22 + 23, 1 + 2 + 22 + 23 + 24, . . .} (16)
is also a Cauchy sequence, but with respect to the (p = 2) p-adic metric dp(a, b) = |a− b|p where
|x|p =
{
p−ordpx if x 6= 0
0 if x = 0
(17)
and
ordpx =
{
the highest power of p which divides x, if x ∈ Z
ordpa− ordpb, if x = a/b, a, b ∈ Z, b 6= 0 (18)
Hence, for example
d2(1 + 2 + 2
2, 1 + 2) = 1/4, d2(1 + 2 + 2
2 + 23, 1 + 2 + 22) = 1/8 (19)
Just at R represents the completion of Q with respect to the Euclidean metric, so the p-adic numbers
Qp represent the completion of Q with respect to the p-adic metric. A general p-adic number can
be written in the form ∞∑
k=−m
akp
k (20)
where a−m 6= 0 and ak ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , p − 1}. The so-called p-adic integers Zp are those p-adic
numbers where m = 0.
It is hard to sense any physical significance to Zp and the p-adic metric from the definition
above. However, they acquire relevance in invariant set theory by virtue of their association with
fractal geometry. In particular, the map F2 : Z2 → C(2)
F2 :
∞∑
k=0
ak2
k 7→
∞∑
k=0
2ak
3k+1
where ak ∈ {0, 1} (21)
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is a homeomorphism [37], implying that every point of the Cantor ternary set can be represented
by a 2-adic integer. More generally,
Fp :
∞∑
k=0
akp
k 7→
∞∑
k=0
2ak
(2p− 1)k+1 where ak ∈ {0, 1, . . . p− 1} (22)
is a homeomorphism between Zp and C(p) To understand the significance of the p-adic metric,
consider two points a, b ∈ C(p). Because Fp is a homeomorphism, then as d(a, b) → 0, so too
does dp(a¯, b¯) where F (a¯) = a, F (b¯) = b. On the other hand, suppose a ∈ C(p), b /∈ C(p). By
definition, if b /∈ C(p), then b¯ /∈ Zp. Let us assume that b ∈ Q (see Footnote 3 above). Then
b¯ ∈ Qp. This implies that dp(a¯, b¯) ≥ p. Hence, d(a, b)  1 6=⇒ dp(a¯, b¯)  1. In particular, it
is possible that dp(a¯, b¯)  0, even if d(a, b)  0. From a physical point of view, a perturbation
which seems insignificantly small with respect to the (intuitively appealing) Euclidean metric, may
be unrealistically large with respect to the p-adic metric, if the perturbation takes a point on C(p)
and perturbs it off C(p). The p-adic metric recognises the primal ontological property of lying on
the invariant set. The Euclidean metric, by contrast, does not.
Let g(x, x′) denote the pseudo-Riemannian metric on space-time, where x, x′ ∈MU . By contrast
let gp(MU ,M′U ) denote a corresponding metric in U ’s state space, transverse to the state-space
trajectories. As above, we suppose that if MU ∈ IU , then gp(MU ,M′U ) → 0 only in the p-adic
sense, ie. only if M′U ∈ IU .
B A Key Number-Theoretic Property of the Cosine Func-
tion
A key number theorem for this paper is this:
Theorem[21, 13]. Let φ/pi ∈ Q. Then cosφ /∈ Q except when cosφ = 0,±1/2,±1.
Proof . Assume that 2 cosφ = a/b where a, b ∈ Z, b 6= 0 have no common factors. Since
2 cos 2φ = (2 cosφ)2 − 2 (23)
then
2 cos 2φ =
a2 − 2b2
b2
(24)
Now a2 − 2b2 and b2 have no common factors, since if p were a prime number dividing both, then
p|b2 =⇒ p|b and p|(a2 − 2b2) =⇒ p|a, a contradiction. Hence if b 6= ±1, then the denominators
in 2 cosφ, 2 cos 2φ, 2 cos 4φ, 2 cos 8φ . . . get bigger without limit. On the other hand, if φ/pi = m/n
where m,n ∈ Z have no common factors, then the sequence (2 cos 2kφ)k∈N admits at most n values.
Hence we have a contradiction. Hence b = ±1 and cosφ = 0,±1/2,±1.
If, moreover, φ/pi is describable by a finite number of bits, then cosφ = 0,±1
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C A Realistic Interpretation of Complex Hilbert Vectors
C.1 One Qubit
Extending the discussion in Section 4, we view the Hilbert vector
|ψa(θ, φ)〉 = cos θ
2
|a〉+ eiφ sin θ
2
|a〉 (25)
as an uncertain element ai ∈ {a, a} selected from the bit string Sa(θ, φ) = {a1, a2, . . . aM}. By
this is meant that there is a deterministic procedure which selects an element of Sa(θ, φ) but this
procedure is sufficiently unpredictable as to be unknowable (Section 10). If the qubit is associated
with a pure state, then M = 2N where N is related to the number of fractal iterates needed to
evolve to a state-space cluster. The probability of selecting any particular element ai is independent
of i. As discussed in the main body of the text, the additive form of (25) results from Pythagoras’
theorem.
Let us start with φ = 0. Then
Sa(θ, 0) = {a a a . . . a︸ ︷︷ ︸
M cos2 θ/2
a a a . . . a︸ ︷︷ ︸
M sin2 θ/2
} (26)
where cos2 θ/2 is a rational number of the form M ′/M for integer 0 ≤ M ′ ≤ M . For a pure state,
then in addition to being rational, cos2 θ/2 and hence cos θ must be finitely describable.
To define Sa(θ, φ) where φ 6= 0, let
ζ{a1 a2 . . . aM} = {aM a1 a2 . . . aM−1}. (27)
Since ζM{a1 a2 . . . aM} = {a1 a2 . . . aM} we can treat ζ as an operator representation of an Mth
root of unity and write ζ = e2pii/M . Using this (25) is defined as an uncertain element of
S(θ, φ) = ζM
′′
Sa(θ, 0) (28)
for integer M ′′, where φ = 2piM ′′/M . When M = 2N then φ/pi must be finitely describable.
Since the selection procedure is assumed chaotic, the uncertain element selected will be sensitive to
the ordering of bit-string elements. Hence, for example, the chaotic procedure will not in general
select the same element when applied to the bit string Sa(θ, 0) as to ζSa(θ, 0). The degree of
unpredictability of the selection procedure is at a maximum for θ = pi/2 when Sa contains equal
numbers of a s and a s, and at a minimum when θ = 0 or pi (where ζ has no impact on the bit
string).
As discussed in the main body of the text, for computational convenience, the values at which
cos2 θ/2 is defined can be extended into the reals, and the Mth roots of unity can be considered
embedded into the complexes. Here it is claimed that such extensions result in the legendary
conceptual problems of quantum theory.
C.2 Two Qubits
In quantum theory, the general tensor-product form for a 2-qubit Hilbert state is given by
|ψab〉 = γ0|a〉|b〉+ γ1eiχ1 |a〉|b〉+ γ2eiχ2 |a〉|b〉+ γ3eiχ3 |a〉|b〉, (29)
33
where γi, χi ∈ R and γ20 + γ21 + γ22 + γ23 = 1. Equation (29) can be written in two equivalent forms.
The first is
|ψab〉 = cos θ1
2
|a〉|ψb(θ2, φ2)〉+ eiφ1 sin θ1
2
|a〉|ψb(θ3, φ3)〉 (30)
where
γ0 = cos
θ1
2
cos
θ2
2
γ1 = cos
θ1
2
sin
θ2
2
γ2 = sin
θ1
2
cos
θ3
2
γ3 = sin
θ1
2
sin
θ3
2
χ1 = φ2 χ2 = φ1 χ3 = φ1 + φ3 (31)
The second is
|ψab〉 = cos θ6
2
|ψa(θ4, φ4)〉|b〉+ eiφ6 sin θ6
2
|ψa(θ5, φ5)〉|b〉 (32)
where
cos
θ1
2
cos
θ2
2
= cos
θ4
2
cos
θ6
2
sin
θ1
2
cos
θ3
2
= sin
θ4
2
cos
θ6
2
cos
θ1
2
sin
θ2
2
= cos
θ5
2
sin
θ6
2
sin
θ1
2
sin
θ1
2
= sin
θ5
2
cos
θ6
2
φ1 = φ4
φ2 = φ6
φ1 + φ3 = φ5 + φ6
(33)
Let us start by assuming all φi = 0. Then in invariant set theory, a pure Hilbert state of the
form (30) is considered an uncertain selection of some particular pair of elements {ai, bi} from the
two bit strings
Sa = {a1 a2 . . . a2N }
Sb = {b1 b2 . . . b2N } (34)
where ai ∈ {a, a}, bi ∈ {b,b}, where all cos2 θi/2 are finitely describable, and where, as above,
the probability of selecting {ai, bi} is independent of i. Using the form of (30) and Fig 6 as
guidance, these bit strings are defined as follows. With reference to the first line in Fig 6a, the first
2N cos2 θ1/2 elements of Sa are a s, and the rest a s. With reference to the second line in Fig 6a,
the first 2N cos2 θ1/2 cos
2 θ2/2 elements of Sb are b s; the next 2
N cos2 θ1/2 sin
2 θ2/2 elements are
b s; the next 2N sin2 θ1/2 cos2 θ3/2 elements are b s and the final 2N sin2 θ1/2 sin2 θ3/2 elements
are b s. Based on this we can assert that the uncertain selection {ai, bi} corresponds to the Hilbert
vector (30) with φ1 = φ2 = φ3 = 0.
Now if we use the relationships (33) it is easily seen that the probability of selecting a from Sa
and b from Sb in Fig 6a is the same as in Fig 6b (as are the probabilities for any other pairs of
elements). These probabilities are the same as implied by the Born rule on (29) with χi = 0. For
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Figure 6: A schematic illustration of the injective correspondence between (34) and (29) where
phase angles are set to zero. In both a) and b) the top line refers to Sa, the bottom line to Sb. Solid
lines illustrate sub-strings of bits which are either a s or b s and ordered differently in a) and b).
Dashed lines refer to sub-strings of elements which are either a s or b s. Hence, for example, panel
b) indicates that the first 2N cos2 θ4/2 cos
2 θ elements of Sa and Sb are a s and b s respectively.
Despite different ordering, panels a) and b) are equivalent in terms of correlations between a and
b (and other pairs of) elements because of the relations (33). Panel a) shows the correspondence
between (34) and (30). Panel b) shows the correspondence between (34) and (32). (30) and (32)
are equivalent forms of the tensor product Hilbert state (29). The role of phase angles is described
in the text.
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example, the probability that ai = a and bi = b is equal to cos2 θ1/2 sin2 θ2 = cos2 θ5/2 sin2 θ6
which is equal to γ21 from (31) and (33).
The three phase degrees of freedom are introduced through the cyclical permutation operators
ζ. Note that we can cyclically permute the two strings {ai} and {bi} together without affecting the
correlations between Sa and Sb. Similarly, from Fig 6a, one can cyclically permute the first cos
2 θ1/2
elements of Sb, or the final sin
2 θ1/2 elements of Sb, without affecting the correlations between Sa
and Sb. Similarly, from Fig 6b, one can cyclically permute the first cos
2 θ6/2 elements of Sa, or the
final sin2 θ6/2 elements of Sa, without affecting the correlations between Sa and Sb. As before, it
is important to note that because of the linkage to cyclical permutations, the corresponding phase
angles must be rational multiples of pi.
Now consider the special case where θ1 = pi/2, θ2 = pi−θ3 (or equivalently, θ6 = pi/2, θ5 = pi−θ4).
Then the correlation between Sa and Sb is equal to − cos θ2 = − cos θ4 and consistent with quantum
theoretic correlations of measurement outcomes on the Bell state
|a〉|b〉+ |a〉|b〉√
2
(35)
where θ2 = θ4 denotes the relative orientation of Alice and Bob’s measurement apparatuses, with
finitely describable cosine. The finite describability of the cosine of the relative orientation of
Alice and Bob’s measuring apparatus is fundamental in invariant set theory’s account of the Bell
Theorem.
It is a simple matter to use the principle of induction to extend the construction described in this
Section to link general m-qubit tensor-product Hilbert states (with rational squared amplitudes)
to families of m (generically partially correlated) bit strings.
D CHSH
Let x = 0, x = 1, y = 0, y = 1 represent four distinct, randomly chosen points on S2 (corresponding
to four distinct randomly chosen directions in physical space). Join together each pair of points by
a great circle. Let θxy denote the angular distance between any x point and any y point.
Let α denote the relative angle between the two possible measuring directions x = 0 and x = 1
of Alice’s measuring apparatus, and let β denote the corresponding angle between y = 0 and y = 1
of Bob’s apparatus. Suppose Alice chooses x = 0. It is always possible for Alice to send a particle
which she has just measured along direction x = 0, back into the instrument to be measured in the
x = 1 direction. This corresponds to a simple (single-qubit) measurement where the input state has
been prepared along x = 0 and the measurement taken along x = 1 (or vice versa if Alice instead
chose x = 1). This means, according to invariant set theory, it must be the case that cosα and
cosβ are finitely describable.
Now consider a spherical triangle comprising any three of the four distinct points x = 0, x = 1,
y = 0 and y = 1. For definiteness, consider the triangle whose vertices are x = 0, x = 1 and y = 0.
The cosine of the angular distance the side joining x = 0 and x = 1 is equal to cosα and therefore
is finitely describable. Suppose Alice and Bob choose x = 0 and y = 0 so that cos θ00 is also finitely
describable. Then, according to the cosine rule for spherical triangles
cos θ01 = cos θ00 cosα+ sin θ00 sinα cos γ (36)
where γ is the angle subtended at x = 1. If γ = 0 then we have the usual co-planar arrangement
of angles. By the theory of Pythagorean triples, if cos θ00 is finitely describable, then sin θ00 is not
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finitely describable (there are no Pythagorean triples {a, b, c} where c is a power of 2). Similarly,
if cosα is finitely describable, then sinα is not. Since θ00 and α are essentially independent angles
(reflecting the independence and finite precision of Alice and Bob’s apparatuses), we can assume
that the product sin θ00 sinα is not in general finitely describable. Hence cos θ01 is the sum of a
term which is finitely describable, and a term which isn’t. Hence cos θ01 is not finitely describable.
With γ a further independently chosen angle, one can assume that this result holds for non-zero γ
too.
Hence, with z = x+y mod 2, in any CHSH experiment the sample space Λz=0 of supplementary
variables from which C(0, 0) and C(1, 1) are computed (based on finitely describable cos θ00 and
cos θ11) must be disjoint from the sample space Λz=1 from which C(0, 1) and C(1, 0) are computed
(based on finitely describable cos θ01 and cos θ10). Hence, the position of the four points in Fig
4a is not identical to that in Fig 4b. This is not physically inconsistent because the measurement
orientations can only be set to some finite precision.
E The Dirac Equation in the Singular Limit N =∞
In this Appendix we discuss the simplest form of the Dirac equation
i~γµ ∂µψ −mcψ = 0 (37)
for a particle of mass m in order to describe dynamical evolution between preparation and mea-
surement in invariant set theory.
As is well known, the Dirac 4-spinor can be written as 2 Weyl 2-spinors. We will associate the
latter with fields of 2N -element bit strings Sa(x, t), Sb(x, t). Consider a frame where the particle is
at rest at x = 0. Let
Sa(0, t) = ζ
nSa(0, 0)
Sb(0, t) = ζ
−nSb(0, 0) (38)
where
n =
2Nmc2
2pi~
t (39)
From (27) we can write
ζn ≡ e2piin/2N = eiωt (40)
where ~ω = mc2. As before, the set {eiωt} of time evolution operators is isomorphic to the
multiplicative group of complex phases φ where φ/2pi is describable by N − 1 bits. With E = mc2,
then
E = ~ω (41)
and with E a source of space-time curvature, this iconic equation of quantum mechanics can be
interpreted is a manifestation of (14), linking space-time geometry to the periodic state-space
geometry of IU . A key property of (38) is the granularity of time. From (39), the unit ∆t of
granularity is given by
∆t =
2pi~
2Nmc2
(42)
the consequences of which will be developed elsewhere.
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Writing
ψ(t) =
(
Sa(0, t)
Sb(0, t)
)
(43)
then the evolution equation (38) can be written as
ψ(t) =
(
eiωt 0
0 e−iωt
)
ψ(0) (44)
For any finite N , {eiωt} is not closed under addition (see (9)). As discussed in the main body of the
text, this is considered a desirable property of invariant set theory, making it counterfactually in-
complete. In the singular limit N =∞, eiωt can be identified with the familiar complex exponential
function, in which case, eiω∆t ≈ 1 + iω∆t for small ∆t and
i∂t e
iωt + ωeiωt = 0
Because the limit is singular, the derivative is undefined for any finite N , no matter how big. In
this sense, the Dirac equation for a particle at rest,
i~γ0 ∂tψ −mc2ψ = 0 (45)
corresponds to the singular limit of (38) at N =∞. In (45), ψ is to be considered some abstract but
computationally powerful ‘wavefunction’, lying in complex Hilbert Space. From the perspective of
invariant set theory, (38) and (39) should be considered more fundamental, but less computationally
powerful, than (45).
In a non-rest frame, we must generalise (38) to include spatial variations and the full set of
Dirac gamma matrices are needed to be relativistically invariant. Quantities such as
γi
(
Sa
Sb
)
=
(
0 σi
−σi 0
)(
Sa
Sb
)
=
(
σiSb
−σiSa
)
(46)
are straightforwardly defined by considering the Pauli matrices as operators on Sa and Sb. For
example
σ2Sb =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
{b1 b2 . . . b2N−1}‖{b2N−1+1 b2N−1+2 . . . b2N } (47)
= ζ2
N−3{b2N−1+1 b2N−1+2 . . .b2N }‖ζ2
N−3{b1 b2 . . . b2N−1} (48)
where ‖ denotes the concatenation operator. Full details will be given elsewhere.
F The PBR Theorem
The recent PBR theorem [36] is a no-go theorem casting doubt on ψ-epistemic theories (where the
quantum state is presumed to represent information about some underlying physical state of the
system). Unlike CHSH where Alice and Bob each choose measurement orientations A or B, here
Alice and Bob, by each choosing 0 or 1, prepare a quantum system in one of four input states to
some quantum circuit: |ψ0〉|ψ0〉, |ψ0〉|ψ1〉, |ψ1〉|ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉|ψ1〉, where
|ψ0〉 = cos θ
2
|0〉+ sin θ
2
|1〉
|ψ1〉 = cos θ
2
|0〉 − sin θ
2
|1〉
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In addition to the parameter θ, the circuit contains two phase angles α and β; as discussed below, the
phase angle α most closely plays the role of the phase angle φ in the Mach-Zehnder interferometer
in Section 4. The output states of the quantum circuit are characterised as ‘Not 00’, ‘Not 01’,
‘Not 10’ and ‘Not 00’. The α and β are chosen to ensure that (according to quantum theory),
if Alice and Bob’s input choices are {IJ} where I, J ∈ {0, 1}, then the probability of ‘Not IJ ’ is
equal to zero. However, if physics is governed by some underpinning ψ-epistemic theory, then, so
the argument goes, at least occasionally the measuring device will be uncertain as to whether, for
example, the input state was prepared using 00 and 01 and on these occasions it is possible that
an outcome ‘Not 01’ is observed when the state was prepared as 01, contrary to quantum theory
(and experiment). How does Invariant Set Theory, which is indeed a ψ-epistemic theory, avoid this
problem?
Working through the algebra, it is found that the probabilities of various outcomes are trigono-
metric functions of α−β, α− 2β, β and θ. For example, if Alice and Bob chose 00, then, according
to quantum theory (and therefore experiment), the probability of obtaining the outcome ‘Not 01’
is equal to
X = cos4
θ
2
+ sin4
θ
2
+ 2 cos2
θ
2
sin2
θ
2
cos(α− 2β) 6= 0 (49)
On the other hand, if Alice and Bob chose 01, then the probability of obtaining the outcome ‘Not 01’
would be equal to
Z = X − 4 cos2 θ
2
sin2
θ
2
− 4 cos3 θ
2
sin
θ
2
cos(α− β)− 4 cos θ
2
sin3
θ
2
cosβ = 0 (50)
The key point is that X contains the trigonometric term cos(α− 2β), whilst Z contains the terms
cos(α − β) and cosβ. Now one can clearly find values for α, β and θ such that X is described
by N bits. That is to say, for large enough N , Invariant Set Theory can predict the quantum
theoretic probability of outcome ‘Not 01’ when Alice and Bob chose 00. However, in general it
is impossible to find values for these angles such that X and Z are simultaneously describable by
N bits. The number-theoretic argument is exactly that used to negate the Bell Theorem. For
example, if cos(α − 2β) and cosβ are describable by a finite number of bits, then cos(α − β) =
cos(α − 2β) cosβ + sin(α − 2β) sinβ is not. This means that if in reality Alice and Bob chose
00 in preparing a particular quantum system and the outcome was ‘Not 01’ , then there is no
counterfactual world on IU where Alice and Bob chose 01 in preparing the same quantum system,
and the outcome was again ‘Not 01’. That is to say, it is not the case that Z = 0 for this
counterfactual experiment - rather, Z is undefined. Conversely, if in reality Alice and Bob chose
01, then there exist values for α, β and θ such that Z is described by N bits and equal to zero (to
within experimental accuracy) and ‘Not 01’ is not observed.
Let {αX , βX , θX} denote a set of angles such that X is describable by N bits, and {αZ , βZ , θZ}
a set of angles such that Z is describable by N bits, i.e. these correspond to experiments on IU .
Now, as before, we can find values such that the differences αZ−αX , βZ−βX and θZ−θX are each
smaller than the precision by which these angles can be set experimentally. Hence, Invariant Set
Theory can readily account for pairs of experiments performed sequentially with seemingly identical
parameters, the first where Alice and Bob choose 00 and the outcome is sometimes ‘Not 01’, and
the second where Alice and Bob choose 01 and the outcome is never ‘Not 01’. That is to say, the
Invariant Set Theoretic interpretation of the PBR quantum circuit reveals no inconsistency with
experiment. Even though Invariant Set Theory is ψ-epistemic, the holistic structure of the invariant
set IU ensures that the measuring device will never be uncertain as to whether, for example, the
input state was prepared using 00 and 01.
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It was shown above that Invariant Set Theory evades the Bell theorem by violating the Mea-
surement Independence assumption. Here it has been shown that Invariant Set Theory evades the
PBR theorem by violating an equivalent Preparation Independence assumption. As before, this
does not conflict at all with the experimenter’s sense of free will. Neither does it imply fine-tuning
with respect to the physically relevant p-adic metric on IU .
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